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1. Introduction
A firm competes with other firms as each tries to sell its product(s) to the consumer. Much of
economics is concerned with the degree of competition between these firms and how various policies
interact with this competition. Surprisingly little attention has been focused on determining just
which products compete with each other. Nonetheless, this question of "Who is the competition?"
is an important one.
Consider the question in the context of a market with which most readers are familiar-the U.S.
automobile market. Here we would ask which automobiles compete with one another. Economic
policy implications abound. Does the purchase of American Motors by the Chrysler Corporation
give Chrysler market power in a particular segment of the market? Would an oil import fee effect
one firm relatively more adversely than other firms? When does the introduction of a new model by
an existing firm significantly increase firm sales and when does such a new model merely reallocate
current sales? Finally, will an import quota on Korean automobiles benefit domestic firms or are
Japanese firms the primary beneficiaries? The answers to all of these questions hinge crucially on
identifying the competition. Also, the issues presented in the above set of questions are not unique
to the automobile industry. A similar set of issues and questions arise in many other industries.
This paper develops an empirical technique, informed by economic theory, which identifies the
competition. 1 Section 2 develops the theory behind our new methodology. Section 3 discusses how
one would empirically implement the theory. Section 4 provides an example of the technique. The
methodology is used to identify the competitors of every 1987 model year automobile. In Section
5, potential problems with this new technique are discussed. We conclude with a brief discussion
of possible applications of the methodology.
1 We note that a purely statistical technique to identify competitors is cluster analysis, which is discussed in Dillon
and Goldstein (1984) and applied in an economic context by Pepall (1987).
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2. Theory
Whether firm A's product competes with firm B's product will depend upon the physical charac-
teristics of the products and how consumers care about these characteristics. Let x = (Xi, x2 , .. , x)
be a vector of characteristics describing a product differentiated in n dimensions. R$ then is the
space in which products are differentiated. The set of products available to the consumer is a dis-
crete set {Xm}, m = 1,..., M. 2 0 = (01, 02, .. , On) represents the vector of preference parameters
for an individual. Different products have different x's and different individuals have different 0's.
An individual's utility is given by:
U(x, 0)+ y, (1)
where y is the quantity consumed of a numeraire good. Prices of the differentiated products are
denoted by Pm. Each consumer's maximization problem can then be stated as:
max U(xm, 0) - Pm. (2)
It will be very convenient to introduce the idea of a consumer's most preferred, or ideal, product
(as in Lancaster, 1979.) In determining the ideal product, we hypothetically assume that all points
in R$ are available as products. This means that we must also specify hypothetical prices for all
z E RS. Prices of goods are related to the characteristics of the goods. Hence:
P = P(x), z E RS, (3)
where we assume that P(zm) = Pm. 3
A consumer's most preferred product, denoted x* is given by:
z* = argrmax {U(x, 0) - P(x)}. (4)
X>0
The first order condition implied by (4) is given by:
U,(z*, ) = P,(z*), (5)
2 The set {Zm}I should also include alternatives to purchasing the differentiated product, such as keeping a used
version. In practice, we shall not include these alternatives as data.
3 In other words, we are assuming that the price function (3) fits the price and characteristics data on the M
models exactly. In practice, we expect that Pm will differ from P(zm) by some error, as discussed in section 5.
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
For many functional forms of (1), condition (5) may be inverted to solve for the unobservable
taste parameters. 4 This implies a mapping between tastes and most preferred products given by:
e = 1(x*). (6)
Now define,
S(x,xz*) U(x, 1(x*)) - P(z). (7)
Equation (7) defines a surplus function S(z, z*). This function gives the surplus associated with
product x when the ideal product is x*. Surplus is maximized at x = x*. Likewise, as x becomes
more different than x* in any of the n dimensions in which the products are differentiated, surplus
declines. 5 Equation (7) also defines iso-surplus contours conditional on a most preferred product,
x*. Surplus is constant along a contour and declines as contours become further from x*. The
shape of these contours will depend upon the functional forms chosen for (1) and (3).
Now the consumer's problem, (2), may be restated as:
max S(xm, x*) = U(x, P(x*)) - Pm. (8)
1<m<M
It is clear that (8) is simply a rewritten version of problem (2), in the sense that model m* will
solve both problems if 0 = (x*).
We propose the following definition of competitors.
Definition: Products A and B are competitors if there exists x* E R+ such that:
S(X, x*) = S(xz, x*) > S(xe, x*) V models C.
This definition states that if A and B are competitors, then a consumer indifferent between A
and B prefers those two models to all other models. There are, though, an infinite number of ideal
varieties, x*, that still leave S(x, z*) = S(Xb, Z*). We need only find one point z* satisfying the
above condition to call A and B competitors.
4 From Gale and Nikaido (1965), a sufficient condition to globally invert (5) obtaining (6) is that the principal
minors of Uge be positive for all z > 0 and 9 > 0. This will be satisfied by the functional form used in Section 3.
5 To see this, consider the second-order approximation S(z, z*) S(z*,z*) + S(z*,z)(z - z*) + (1/2)(z -
z*)' Sz,(z*,z*)(z - z*). From (5) and (7), we see that S,(z,z*) = 0 and S.,(z,z*) = [U,(z, ) -P,(*]
which is negative definite from the second order conditions for (4). It follows that S(z,z*) S(z*, z*)+ (1/2)(z -
z*)'[U,(z*, 9) - P,,(z*)](z - z*), which declines as any component of r moves further away from z*.
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Figure 1 illustrates our definition. Points A, B, and C represent available products differentiated
in characteristics x1 and x2. Si represents the surplus contour of an individual with an ideal product
x* who is indifferent between A and B (since A and B lie on the same iso-surplus contour.) S2
represents the surplus contour of an individual with an ideal product x who is also indifferent
between A and B. In Figure 1, models A and B are competitors since S(za,x*)[= S(xb,2*)] >
S(ze, z*) as drawn. The fact that S(z., z)[= S(zb, z)] < S(ze, z) means that a consumer with
ideal product z would buy model C rather that A or B.
The above definition has several appealing qualities. These include: a) As in a Hotelling model,
relations between competitors may be intransitive. Indeed, in Figure 1, A and C are competitors
as are B and C, yet A and C are not; b) The definition is symmetric. If A is a competitor of B,
B is necessarily a competitor of A; c) The definition is easily empirically implemented. This is the
subject to which we now turn.
3. Implementing the Theory
The first step towards implementing the theory requires imposing functional forms on the utility
function (1) and on the price function (3). While there is not a clearly right or wrong functional
form for utility, some functional forms are better than others. One requirement is that the number
of taste parameters 0, equal the number of characteristics x2. In addition, it is desirable to be able
to vary the concavity of the utility function in a parametric manner. These goals are achieved by
using a constant elasticity of substitution functional form:
U(x,-1) = (zi -1). (9)
i=1
The elasticity of substitution between characteristics is o = -g with 6 < 1. 6
It will be important for empirical work that the price function (3) fit the data well. With this
requirement in mind, empirical work often imposes (or tests) a log-linear functional form on the
price function. Hence:
P(x) = exp(a + #'x) (10)
where a and #i = (#31,#32, ---,/3,n) > 0 are parameters.
Given these functional forms, the mapping (6) between tastes and most preferred products
becomes:
6 As 6 -. 0, the utility function becomes U(z, 8) = C 9;lnaz;.
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6, = (zi)1 -i3 exp(f'x* + a). (11)
The surplus function is:
#
S(x,x) = exp('x* +a) (z;)-(xi-1).- exp(I3'x +a) (12)
The iso-surplus contours implicitly defined by (12) resemble ellipsoids but are not symmetric.
Rather, they are slightly egg-shaped.
The next task is to implement the definition of competitors using the surplus function (12).
Given two potential competitors, products A and B, the first step is to identify the consumers with
preferences 0, and hence a most preferred product x*, such that S(Xa, z*) = S(xb, x*). As discussed
in the previous section, there are an infinite number of points x* such that S(Xa,X*) = S(Xb, x*),
and in principle we need to check each of them to see whether Definition 1 holds. In practice, we
shall simplify the task by only considering points x* such that x* = fX+(1-a)Xb with 0 < Q < 1.
That is, we restrict attention to ideal products z* which lie on a line segment between Za and x.
In many cases, such as illustrated in Figure 1, this approach will correctly identify whether A and
B are competitors. However, since we have restricted the search for x*, it is certainly possible that
we will omit some models as competitors, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except that the position of model C has changed. Ideal product x*
satisfies S(xa, x*) = S(zb, x*) and x* = Ozxa + (1- z)xb. Since S(@a,z*)[= S(zb, x")] < S(cs*),
we would reject models A and B as competitors by only considering x* lying on a line segment
between za and Xb. However, we also see that S(x, x)[= S(z:, z)]> S(, x), so models A and B
are competitors by Definition 1. Summing up, our method can reject models as competitors when
they really are, but it clearly can never accept models as competitors when they are not. In section
5, we discuss how serious this limitation may be.
With many models A, B, C, D, ... available, we calculate z* on a line segment between eacg
two models with equal surplus obtained from the two. We then check whether greater surplus is
obtained from any other model. Is so, then the two models are (possibly incorrectly) rejected as





In this section, we identify the competitors to the 136 models which made up the 1987 new
car market in the United States. 7 The automobile market provides an especially nice test of our
methodology. It is a market with which most readers are familiar, hence the plausibility of our
results is readily examined. It is also a market with many differentiated products and plentiful
data.
We first choose the dimensions in which products are differentiated. Data were available on
13 characteristics of every model. 8 We choose the relevant characteristics by applying nested
hypothesis testing to the OLS estimation of the price function (10). The estimated price function
is:
LOGPRICE = -. 685 + .000119 WT + .121 CARB1 + .0030 TORQ + .156 PS1+
(.519) (.000059) (.051) (.0007) (.053) (13)
.407 AIR1+ .252 FOR1 + 53.8 INVHT 2
(.053) -(.045) (25.6)
Of the 13 differentiating characteristics on which data were available, nested hypothesis testing
resulted in a characteristics space differentiated in seven dimensions. These are weight of the
vehicle (WT), engine torque (TORQ), the inverse of the height of the vehicle (INVHT), whether
the auto had fuel injection (CARB1), air conditioning (AIR1), and power steering (PS1) as standard
equipment, and whether the auto was foreign (FOR1). 9 All variables refer to the base model of a
product.
Use of binary variables in the context of identifying competition deserves special note. We view
the variables PS1 and AIR1 as proxies for increasing degrees of luxury. Similarly, the FOR1 may
proxy for perceived quality or longevity. In these contexts, a most preferred product may well have
a value for these variables that is between the all-or-nothing choice imposed by available products.
Characteristics such as horsepower and mile per gallon of gasoline, items many consumers may
deem important, were not statistically significant 10 in the price function. This is because these
7 When a model is produced by two divisions of the same corporation and the models only differ cosmetically,
such as the Ford Escort and the Mercury Lynx, only one of the models is used in the sample.
8 Please refer to the Data Appendix for a complete description of the data set.
9The dumrny variables CARB1, PSi, and AIR1 took the value of 2 if the feature was standard equipment and 1 if
not. FOR1 took the value of 2 if the auto was produced abroad and 1 if dornestically produced. (Models which were
produced both in the U.S. and abroad are considered foreign models.) This differs from the usual 0-1 convention,
but is necessary since sorne durnmy variables are raised to negative powers in calculating the surplus function. This
departure frorm convention only changes the constant in the regression and has no effect on the results.
10 "Statistically significant" refers to an estimate being statistically significantly different from zero.
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characteristics are spanned by linear combinations of included variables such as weight, inverse of
height, and torque. Including the statistically insignificant characteristics in the price function (13)
would have posed two problems. First, inclusion would have induced multicollinearity. This is a
relatively minor problem as estimates are still unbiased, and we only use the parameter estimates,
not their estimated standard errors, in the surplus function. " More importantly, each character-
istic included in the price function represents a dimension in which one much search for potential
competitors. With too many characteristics, the search becomes computationally burdensome.
Estimated coefficients in the price function are used to parameterize the surplus function (12).
The only unidentified parameter in the surplus function is 6 which is related to the elasticity of
substitution between characteristics. We are unable to econometrically identify 6 with our data.
Rather, we set 6 equal to a variety of plausible values and test the robustness of our results.
12 Setting 6 = -3 for the base case scenario, competitors to every 1987 automobile model were
identified using the procedure described above. The results are given in Table 1. Table 1 tells one,
for example, that model 2, the Acura Legend, has as competitors models 4 - the Alfa Romeo Milano,
8 - the Sterling, 40 - the Nissan Maxima, and 69 - the Volvo 740. The number or competitors to
a model varies from one (the Chevrolet Corvette) to sixteen (the Renault Medallion). With few
exceptions, the results accord well with intuition.
Two types of sensitivity analysis were performed to check the robustness of the results in Table
1. First, 6 was set equal to -.01 and then to -1.0. Each time, the analysis was repeated. Second,
the order in which hypotheses are tested when conducting nested hypothesis testing may affect the
outcome of the tests. Recognizing this, we used engine horsepower in the price function instead
of using the variable torque, and repeated the analysis. 13 Robustness of the results depends on
the question being posed. In general, if a model has four competitors, about 3 of these will remain
competitors when 6 is varied or when the characteristics space is redefined. Hence, if one wishes
only to determine if model X is a competitor of model Y, answers may change with specification
changes. If, on the other hand, one wants to know the group of competitors a product faces, results
are quite robust.
11 Were multicollinearity too severe, though, the design matrix might be so ill-conditioned that inversion difficulties
arise. In addition, negative estimnated values for A can lead the surplus function (12) to violate the properties in
footnote 5.
12 This procedure was used in a different context by Feenstra (1988). Note that lower (negative) values for 6 lead
to utility and surplus functions which are more concave.
13 The results of these sensitivity analyses are available upon request.
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5. Caveats
We believe the methodology discussed in this paper is a valuable tool and can be profitable
applied to many economic problems. However, our analysis has a number of limitations, and in
this section we give an economic interpretation for two such limitations.
First, when calculating surplus in (12) we have subtracted the predicted price from the hedonic
regression (13) rather than the actual price. This means that we are treating the error term from
the hedonic regression as reflecting only unmeasured characteristics of a model, which yield utility
exactly equal to the dollar error. It follows that -surplus is properly calculated as utility from
measured characteristics minus the predicted price, as in (12).
An alternative approach we considered was to treat the error in the hedonic regression as
reflecting pure price markups, with no unmeasured characteristics. In this case, actual rather than
predicted prices are used in (12). However, this approach fails in practice, because we find that
certain models with actual prices much greater than predicted prices are never purchased. That
is, a grid search over 0 shows that every consumer would avoid the high prices of certain models,
and choose another model with similar characteristics. In future research, it would be desirable
to assume that the errors in (13) reflect some combination of unmeasured characteristics and pure
price markups.
Second, because most preferred products lie on lines drawn between available products, the
methodology may omit some models as competitors. In particular, it is -unable to account for the
preferences of consumers whose ideal product lies outside the convex hull of all available products.
14 This is unlikely to be a problem in a market with many available models and minimal entry
barriers facing new products. Were there a high density of consumers in a part of characteristics
space outside the convex hull of available models, such a market niche would likely be a profitable
one. Given the actual absence of available models, we conclude that there are not likely to be many
consumers whose preferences lie outside the convex hull of available products. While this caveat,
then, does not apply to the automobile market with its myriad products, it may well apply to the
super-computer market.
14 In figure 2, the convex hull of available products is the triangle with vertexes at A, B, anid C. Our method fails
to identify A and B as competitors because the ideal product x lies outside the convex hull.
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6. Potential Applications
Product differentiation has recently been a much researched topic in the International Trade
and the Industrial Organization literatures. Almost all of this research has been theoretical. A
wide range of these issues may be empirically investigated using the methodology described above.
Levinsohn (1988) estimated an ad-hoc demand system in which identification of competitors was
used to impose cross price elasticity zero restrictions. Work on estimating a utility consistent
demand system for differentiated products is in progress by the authors.
Anti-trust analysis is often directed at ascertaining whether firm mergers will give rise to market
power in a particular segment of the market. The answer often depends on how the market
is defined. The method of identifying the competition is a natural tool for the job. Similarly,
one could easily investigate the dynamic competitive effects of government policies such as taxes,
subsidies, bail-outs, tariffs, and quotas by analyzing how competitors change over time in response
to the policies.
The methodology also has natural marketing applications. Given the characteristics of a po-
tential entrant, it is straightforward to determine with which products the potential entrant would
compete.
These are but a few examples. The methodology presented in this paper is a first attempt at
devising a much needed empirical tool. We hope the methodology will facilitate empirical work
in International Trade, Industrial Organization, and Public Economics. We also hope others are
stimulated to improve on the methodology itself.
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Data Appendix
The data used is from the 1987 Automotive News Market Data Book. The entire data set
is available on floppy disk from the authors on request. Collected variables (and their units of
measurement) are Overall Length (inches), Overall Width (inches), Overall Height (inches), Curb
Weight (lbs.), Engine Displacement (cubic inches), Carburation (2 in fuel injected, 1 otherwise),
Net Horsepower, Net Torque (foot pounds), Power Steering (1 if not standard, 2 if standard),
Power Brakes (1 if not standard, 2 if standard), Air Conditioning (1 if not standard, 2 if standard),
Foreign (1 if domestic, 2 if foreign), and List Price (dollars).
The source code of the FORTRAN 77 program which implemented the identification of com-
petitors is also available from the authors on request.
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38 54 58 135
15 30 70 79
40 60 70
61 83 86 111 112 113
50 55
17 25 55 56
27 43 59 77 92 131
32 55
14 31 64 116 135
50 55 71 87
5 35 41. 58 59 66
51 87 115
34 39 47 66 114 124.
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28 36 44
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24 36 69
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9 35 1 54 58 116
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11 60 70
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37 60 61
47 48 57 89 90 96
36 45
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47 75 96 119 133
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10 46 78 81 89 110 130
29 84 110 123
5 78 79 89 91 102 103 108 135
72 85 127 134
12 86 111 113 127
29 80 122 123
82 122
12 29 46 61 83 110 111 123 127
18 20 115 135
26 52 67 91 98 99 106 117 129 135 136
43 59 68 69 77 79 81 92 102 130 131 133
43 47 119 133
39 66 73 81 88 1 107 129 136
15 72 78 93 131
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75 81 89 108
81 104 108 109
103 126
83 86 93 97
98 115 117 135
91 101 125 129
75 81 96 102
47 57 96 103
46 78 79 80
86 94 113 127
111 112
56 62 65 98
87 98 106 135
38 52 53 54
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